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 STATE OF DEMOCRACY 
  
The period since 1997 has been one of enormous dynamism and reform intensity. 
This period can usefully be subdivided into two segments: one encompassing the time 
until late 1999 and the other stretching to late 2001. The former is marked by the 
rapid implementation of an extensive reform programme, the enhancement of 
institutional stability through legal codification and enforcement, extensive public 
support for reform, firm anchoring of Bulgaria in the EU and NATO enlargement 
scenarios, stability of party system and little electoral volatility. The end of 1999 and 
the beginning of 2000 provide a turning point in the recent evolution of Bulgarian 
democracy. The main reasons for the shift can be sought among the following: the 
continued inability of the political system to deliver public goods in a setting of 
extensive economic and administrative reform; emergence of a heightened sense of 
personal insecurity; subsequent decline in public support for radical reform, continued 
social and economic stratification exacerbated by persistent perception of improper 
privatization and distribution of budgetary funds.    
  
  
1997 – 1999 – DEMOCRACY RENEWED 
  
Following the collapse of the socialist government in early 1997 and the massive 
street protests which helped bring its downfall, there ensued a time of sustained 
strengthening of Bulgarian democracy. The emergence of a stable, reformist 
governing majority swept into power by a massive electoral majority allowed the 
implementation of a programme of radical reform in economy and society. Macro-
economic stability, resumption of moderate economic growth, extensive privatization 
and re-structuring and tax reform – these are a few of the items on a loaded agenda of 
economic reform. These were accompanied by the complete overhaul of the 
administrative system, reform of the social security system, health care, pension 
system and educational reform. The country was firmly anchored in the frameworks 
of EU and NATO enlargement coupled with a very active regional policy. Organized 
crime was contained and crime reduced over this period. Export of organized crime 
from the conflict areas of the region was largely prevented. In polity, the values of 
Euro- Atlantic integration were further internalized by the political elites. The party 
system continued to be predictable as the main opposition, socialist party sought to 
further anchor itself in the reform agenda. Over the period, public support for reform 
was sustained at comfortable levels.  
  
The latter part of 1999 saw the beginning of a shift in public attitudes. The continued 
inability of the political system to deliver effectively public goods, the increasing 
magnitude of economic hardship due to unemployment and restructuring, the low 
levels of income even for individuals in employment, the extensive reform of all 
systems of insurance contributed to a heightened sense of insecurity of individuals. 
This was exacerbated by the continued social and economic stratification further 
worsened by the persistent perception of improper privatization and distribution of 
budgetary funds. The governing Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) began to be 
perceived as an entity firmly divided in camps whose interests are advanced in the 
process of privatization and government. The sequencing and intensity of reform had 
abruptly re-defined central social and economic footholds of individuals, thereby 
placing them in a situation of extreme volatility. These parameters of developments 
persisted and worsened through to 2001. Individuals found themselves in a situation 
of extreme volatility of all major systems accompanied by a sudden reduction and 
visible ineffectiveness of the involvement of the state and consequently reduced their 
expectations of state and polity to an extent of extreme political detachment and 
apathy. Thus, in the summer of 2001, the political system found itself in a situation 
where the support for the two main parties had shrunk to around 20 % each with the 
remainder of the electorate unwilling to be engaged in politics. There was little 
credibility for the established political elites beyond their immediate constituents. The 
vacuum was filled by the movement of the former king, Simeon II on a wave of 
populism and promise of immediate relief as well as a new morality.       
  
  
  
PRESENT STATE OF DEMOCRACY 
  
The contours of the current state of democracy have already been provided and the 
present challenges can be examined at four distinct levels: volatility of social 
framework, crisis of representation and legitimacy, crisis of values of public 
interaction and crisis of the political system. These can be examined in turn. 
  
  
Volatility of Social Framework 
  
Volatility of social framework has increased due to the continued effects of the misfit 
between the reform agenda and the short- and mid-term expectations of citizens. The 
radical and extensive programme of privatization and economic re-structuring has led 
to unprecedented levels of unemployment and the virtual wipe-out of entire sectors of 
the economy and the social networks underpinned by economic activity. There has 
been a systemic process of impoverishment in numerous sectors of economy and 
society. In addition, there are sectors of society which seem completely unable, in the 
short and medium – term, to resume employment. Economic recovery has been 
patchy, in and around the major cities of the country. This has taken place in a context 
of extreme monetary restriction, which has virtually prevented the employment of 
many pro-active instruments by the state. The much necessary overhaul of the social 
insurance, pension and health care systems has resulted in the undermining of basic 
pillars of social reference and existence, producing enormous personal insecurity and 
psychological volatility. This has translated into a notable mistrust in the capacity of 
government to provide a set of services and frameworks which ensure predictability 
and well – being. In such a mindset, the political is predominantly perceived as the 
site of improper redistribution and individual enrichment rather than a provider of 
basic services. Yet, this mistrust has proved compatible with a disposition to expect 
positive changes in welfare through major, abrupt shifts – mainly through 
redistribution.  
  
  
Crisis of representation and legitimacy  
  
The misfit between the requirements of radical reform and expectations of citizens has 
already been mentioned. This misfit has been worsened by the delay in reform and by 
the restrictive monetary framework, thereby further intensifying the negative impact 
of the shift. The subsequent inability of the political system to deliver public goods 
and ensure personal security has led to a legitimacy crisis, which found its expression 
only in the middle of 2001. This is also a crisis of representation, which is difficult to 
counter for a series of reasons. Firstly, reforms tend to initially disaggregate groups 
and interests. This has been highly visible in the creation of a rather amorphous group 
of “losers of reform”. Secondly, group and interest differentiation proceed with the 
pace of reform and tend to increase towards the completion of reforms with the 
crystallization of new configurations of interest and grouping. Thirdly, it continues to 
be seen precisely what forms representation will assume in settings where previous 
patterns of social linkage have largely disintegrated and economies have been de-
industrialized.  
  
There is a larger question that needs to be highlighted here. It is the question of the 
actual structure of post – transition society and its modes of representation. Structure 
here could be defined through income, distribution of employment, value frameworks, 
etc. Bulgarian transition has produced a society largely depleted, through emigration, 
of its most active and innovative members, a large group of unemployed people 
through de-industrialization, a slowly expanding, city – based entrepreneurial group 
of individuals and a large group of retirees. While this is a sketchy description, it 
provides the elements of post – transition society. The 2001 UNDP Report on Human 
Development provides an adequate snapshot of structure by employment. 20 % of the 
people are employed in services while 12.1 % are employed in industrial production. 
4.4 % of all individuals own their businesses and only 2.2 % derive their income from 
employment in agriculture. 2.4 % define their occupation as housewives while 2.1 % 
are employed in either seasonal work or in what they define as casual work. A full 
35.4 % of the population consists of retirees while 16.5 % are unemployed. 4.1 % are 
either in school or in higher education. What emerges is a diverse picture of 
employment with very high numbers of people who are either past their retirement 
age or unemployed. On the other hand, the number of individuals in industrial 
production has declined notably while employment in services, as share of total 
employment, has continued to rise. Organization membership provides a further 
important dimension. Only 10.5 % of the population is members of a trade union. 
Within this percentage, individuals in state and industrial employment are much more 
likely to join a trade union. Those individuals employed in the private sector and in 
service industries are much less likely to join such organizations. Given the steady 
decline in state and industrial employment, the catchment area of unions and their 
capacity to represent effectively their membership will further decrease in importance. 
  
Other trends in group membership confirm the reluctance of citizens to participate in 
collective forms of organization. 8.1 % of the population is members of a political 
party while 4.8 % have joined their local cultural centers. 4.6 % are participants in the 
work of non – governmental organizations and 4.1 % have joined various clubs. 
Importantly, only 2.3 % have become members of their professional or business 
organizations. Low membership undermines both the capacity of these organizations 
to ensure effective representation and their legitimacy within the very communities 
they seek to represent.  
  
This attitude is confirmed by the opinions of respondents in relation to intermediary 
structures. For instance, only 12 % of individuals hold the opinion that non – 
governmental organizations defend public interests while 15 % are firmly convinced 
that these organizations seek to protect solely their own interests. Similar distrust in 
the actual protection and representation of interest can be found for other intermediary 
institutions. A reflection of the sense of distrust in intermediaries can be detected in 
the opinions of individuals on the reasons for civic non – participation. 85.6 % of 
respondents hold the view that “they will not be heard” while 75 % find a tendency 
whereby a few individuals “hijack the agenda” to their own benefit. 69.2 % of all 
individuals do not recognize an institution, which is sufficiently capable or willing to 
represent their views in the public arena. When they have a grievance, 51.7 % simply 
do not know which institution to approach.  
  
It will come as little surprise that in such a setting, citizens have a marked preference 
for direct engagement. Asked which institutions they would rather have as their 
representative, almost 44 % of all respondents in the UNDP 2001 Report express their 
preference for the local media. Around 30 % would prefer their union to be the active 
part while 29 % expect their local cultural center to be the subject of interest 
representation. On the question of forms of engagements, an interesting statistic 
appears. 68.7 % of all individuals find referenda as very appropriate in conveying 
opinion while 68.2 % find elections as the most suitable means. Surveys are the 
preferred option for 40.1 % of the people while 36 % are in favour of public meetings 
and discussions. It is interesting to note that a large group of people (around 42 %) 
recognizes the need to organize collectively in order to present a bill to Parliament. 
Further evidence of the preference for direct engagement can be found in the attitudes 
towards the Ombudsman. While there is insufficient awareness of the precise 
functions of the Ombudsman and its location in the system of institutions, there is 
widespread support for its introduction. Only 24.7 % of respondents think that there 
are a sufficient number of institutions that deal with grievances. A full 75.3 % hold 
the opinion that there is a clear need for the institution of the Ombudsman.  
  
The issue of emigration has been touched upon only briefly. Yet, this has proven to be 
a central feature of the evolution of society over the past 12 years. While estimates on 
emigration vary, a consensus seems to exist that close to 1 out of 10 people have left 
the country since 1989. Understandably, this has mostly involved individuals in the 18 
– 30 age group. Moreover, there is now a persistent propensity to view emigration as 
one of the major options for personal development. According to the UNDP 2001 
Human Development Report, 36.5 % of all respondents express a readiness to leave 
the country with the remaining 63.5 % declaring no intention to emigrate. It should be 
noted that only 8.5 % of those declaring an intention to emigrate do not intend to 
return to the country. The remaining 28 % seem more interested in short – term 
emigration, possibly linked to potential employment in another country. The statistics 
for the 18 – 38 age – group do, however, present a worrying picture. 67.7 % of 
respondents from this age – group declare their intent to leave the country. 18.8 % of 
those declare that they do not intend to return. The remaining 48.9 % express an 
interest in emigration, which is short – term and purpose – oriented in nature.    
  
What has emerged is a society distrustful of intermediaries and with a distinct 
preference for direct contact with administration and government. It is a society 
whose members see little purpose or utility in group membership. In economy, they 
either seek employment in the public sector or prefer complete self – reliance. In 
society, they spend little time or effort beyond the nuclear or extended family. In such 
a setting, it remains a challenge to define the forms and modes of functioning of 
representation, which would enhance democracy. Clearly, we are not witnessing the 
emergence of the classical modes of representation around employment, religious and 
political affiliation. This accounts partly for the difficulties in representation and 
legitimacy in the post – transition period. The introduction and improvement of 
functioning of the forms of direct engagement are one likely source of greater system 
responsiveness. New skills of the political and administrative elites seem to be 
required in a situation where interest aggregation and representation are diffuse and 
emerge in new ways.      
  
The crisis of representation has been exacerbated by the continued ineffectiveness of 
public administration and the judicial system. The system of public administration has 
undergone a transformation, which was long overdue. The adoption of a 
comprehensive package of legislation introducing clear criteria for entry and 
promotion, paths for career development, clear separation between the administrative 
and political levels and stability of legal norm has been very useful. Nevertheless, this 
process has not halted the continued ineffectiveness of administration and the 
provision of services. Citizen interaction with public administration remains a source 
of dissatisfaction. The judicial system has been marred by numerous allegations of 
corruption and systemic inability to handle grievances in a manner, which ensures 
fairness. Backlog, inefficiency and lack of transparency have meant that access of 
justice has been severely limited. As a result, one of the main structures of a 
functioning democracy, ensuring the rule of law has been severely discredited in the 
opinions of citizens.  
  
Public Interaction 
  
At another level, these phenomena have contributed to a volatility and crisis of core 
values of public interaction and life. Decline in the basic trust of public interaction, in 
the ability to define a meaningful time perspective, decline in trust in its 
sustainability, volatility of pillars of social reference, undermining of the trust in the 
capacity of public interaction to effect change – these features of society have 
produced an environment of intense discontent with an irrationalist twist. The ensuing 
extreme anxiety and personal insecurity produce a situation where rational public and 
policy discourse and expectations are superceded by a disproportional, irrational 
expectation in “magical” interventions, which will lead to sudden change of fortune. 
In addition, these circumstances re-activate modes of traditional interaction. We see 
the re-emergence of the traditional, immediate, inter – personal, family – based mode 
of solidarity. What emerges is a mixture of traditional solidarity and extreme 
individual atomization in any circumstance beyond the familial. The main expressions 
of this disposition include the following: tendency to abstain from public and political 
activity and abstention from voting; increasing volatility of electoral behavior among 
those groups with weak party identification and tendency to invest a disproportionate 
amount of expectation in populist, “quick – fix” political programmes followed by 
intense disappointment upon failure to deliver in the very short – term.   
  
On another note, it continues to be difficult to see the “march through the institutions” 
of the “1989-generation”. The involvement of the groups and individuals who were at 
the center of political change at the turn of the decade has been sporadic and difficult 
to evaluate. To derive an adequate understanding of social change, it is important to 
be able to evaluate the roles that new generations have played in society, polity and 
economy. It is crucial to examine the impact that such groups have had at the level of 
professional communities, administrative institutions, political parties, in business – in 
all walks of life. Such knowledge has been difficult to obtain through sociological 
surveys. Change at the level of small groups could rather be examined through 
anthropological analysis. An estimate of the extent to which new generations have 
been able to influence the assumptions, values and modes of functioning of various 
groups and levels of social life could provide important insights.  
  
  
Crisis of the Political System 
  
In politics, the above – mentioned phenomena have been translated into support for a 
type of legitimacy based on personal charisma. In 2001, this has been personified by 
the former king, Simeon II whose movement was swept into power during the 
elections in June. His “National Movement Simeon II” managed to attain a level of 
electoral support in the 40 percentile in just over two month’s time. Such movements 
are a pre-party form of political organization whose cohesion is ensured by personal 
charisma rather than commonality of vision or interest. In most instances, such 
movements are predicated on corporatist assumptions about social and political 
organization. As such, they often espouse an anti – party ideology, positing a critique 
of factionalism and lack of unity of purpose. The movement of Simeon II claims that 
it seeks to bring forth a deeper, truer reality of the social body and give expression to 
its aspirations. The movement employs an organic type of discourse, its whole 
presence ultimately posited on a father – figure who is in possession of a unique 
capacity of knowledge, direction and means. The reluctance to register the movement 
as a political party then comes as little surprise. The insufficient democratic 
mechanisms within the movement and its Parliamentary group are another notable 
feature. Personal charisma is notoriously prone to volatility and is most often short – 
term in nature. The level of support for the movement has decreased markedly within 
less than four months in office. According to the UNDP 2001 Report, just over 22 % 
of the electorate would support the former King were elections to be held in 
November 2001. The rate of approval for his government has also slumped. 
According to the December 2001 Survey of Alpha Research, a sociological survey 
agency, the current rate of approval for the government stands at 56 %. This is to be 
contrasted to the 81 % rate of approval in the month of August 2001. While the level 
of support for the government of the charismatic figure of the former King might be 
expected to stabilize for the short – term, it is crucial for institutions and political 
parties to begin to function effectively in order to restore at least a semblance of 
rational, legalistic legitimacy.  
  
Another element of this crisis is to be found in the emergence of political apathy. 
Notable electoral apathy has already been evident in the Presidential election in 
November 2001 (42 % turnout in first round and 55 % turnout in second round). In 
December 2001, the new mayor of the city of Sliven was elected with 13 % of the 
vote. As has already been mentioned, there is an increase in the reluctance of citizens 
to engage in civic and political action. What is emerging is the perception that only 
through direct engagement can one reasonably expect to obtain desired outcomes. The 
salience of such a disposition can have important political implications. One might 
involve further erosion of the legitimacy of intermediary institutions such as political 
parties. A further consequence might involve the increase in degree of citizen 
readiness for direct action and immediate expression of discontent. Short – term, it 
has implications for parties in transition or initial structuring. This would entail the 
adoption of strategies of dialogue and interaction with citizens and groups at the local 
level and on specific issues. Still, the readiness to participate in elections remains 
relatively high. According to the 2001 UNDP Report, 62.7 % of respondents confirm 
their firm intention to vote in a next round of elections. Only 10.6 % definitely intend 
to stay away from the polls while 21.9 % are undecided and are still to make their 
choice.  
  
As implied, viable political parties are a crucial element of stable democracy. The 
party landscape is presently in need of urgent reconstruction. The parties have been 
very ineffective in aggregating interests and ensuring compatibility of the reform 
agenda with the emerging stratification of society. They have also been largely 
unsuccessful in recruiting able individuals to senior party and policy positions, 
thereby creating an image of politics as a field for failed or prematurely retired 
professionals from other walks of life. The Union of Democratic Forces (which 
governed the country between 1997 and 2001) has managed to survive the electoral 
onslaught incurred to governing right – wing parties of reform in countries such as 
Poland and Romania. At the June 2001 election, it still managed to capture 18 % of 
the votes. The patterns of group configuration within the party are presently being 
played out once the “glue of government” is no longer there. This has meant the 
establishment of a new splinter party – the Union of Free Democrats. There is a clear 
need for change of leadership, recruitment of local informal and formal leaders, 
widening of its appeal to individuals who have not been among the “winners” of the 
transition and translating the language of EU and NATO integration into a tangible, 
perceivable reality.  
  
The left Bulgarian Socialist Party also continues to face a number of challenges, 
including the need to renew its leadership structures with individuals possessing solid 
social – democratic credentials, the need to reach beyond its narrow electoral base of 
retirees and unemployed and to ensure compatibility between the reform agenda and 
the immediate aspirations for significant re-distribution among many of its voters. At 
the June 2001 election, it gained 17 % of the vote.  
  
The governing movement of Simeon II has declared its firm intention to register as a 
political party. The movement faces a number of difficulties: establishment of clear, 
recognizable set of ideas, creation of structure which ensures sufficient cohesion 
beyond the personal charisma of the leader, containment of emerging competing 
camps, establishment of mechanisms to ensure separation of party structures from 
those of government, etc. The challenges, facing parties as institutions of democracy 
have already been highlighted. There will be little long – term stability of the 
democratic system without a successful attempt to establish modes of dialogue and 
representation vis-à-vis a skeptical public with a deepening disposition to “go it alone”.  
  
The Bulgarian party system has long been described as a two – party system with a 
significant ethnicity – based party, which may hold the balance of power in situations 
of electoral proximity between the two major parties – the Union of Democratic 
Forces (UDF) and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). Quite clearly, the emergence 
of the national movement of Simeon II and its success at the last Parliamentary 
elections have led to a radical disruption of the party system. The previous two main 
parties have collectively gained less than 40 % of the total vote. Nevertheless, it is 
still unclear whether the last elections represent an aberration or a sign of systemic 
change. It remains to be seen if the movement of the former King does have a future 
as a political party or whether difficult reform and governmental instability might not 
lead to a fragmentation and subsequent distribution along the axis of the UDF – BSP. 
The clear split of the vote at the last Presidential elections between the candidate of 
the BSP, Mr. Georgi Parvanov and the incumbent President, Mr. Petar Stoyanov, 
supported by the UDF, seems to point in this direction. Yet, the increasing number of 
voters who change allegiance and the reduction of size of the core of the vote for the 
two main parties do suggest an opening for new political parties.  
  
A distinct feature of the present state of democracy is the increase in electoral 
volatility. It has already been mentioned that the previous main parties gained less 
than 40 % of the vote at the June 2001 Parliamentary elections. The reduction of the 
core vote of the two main parties since 1989 has already been well documented. 
Clearly, there is a process of weakening party identification. There is further evidence 
of volatility. Respondents to the 2001 UNDP Report were asked if they had voted for 
the same political party at the last two Parliamentary elections. Only 35.4 % of the 
voters responded in the affirmative while 32.7 % stated that they had supported 
different parties at the last two elections. The increasing propensity of voters to 
change allegiance and the increasing number of individuals who decide how to vote 
during the pre – election campaign point to a steady increase in volatility. This will 
continue to make elections less predictable. A somewhat unrelated issue does provide 
some clues as to what type of political parties are likely to enjoy electoral 
prominence. Respondents to the 2001 UNDP Report were asked to decide on the 
proper mode of decision – making for the compilation of party election lists and 51.9 
% of them regarded public meetings open to all citizens as the best mode of choosing 
party candidates. Only 8.3 % of the interviewed thought that these decisions should 
best be left to the party leadership and a meager 1.7 % thought that the party leader is 
best placed to make these decisions. Such attitudes do suggest that the capacity of 
parties to manage to conduct effective dialogue with citizens and social groups and 
propose detailed policies will receive electoral backing. Party identification and 
ideology seem to matter less to an increasing number of voters.    
  
The appearance and present prominence of the movement of the former king Simeon 
II brings into focus yet another important issue – the continuation and replacement of 
political elites. Public opinion is often at odds with itself on this question. On the one 
hand, voters quickly grow tired of the political elite as reforms begin to take their toll 
and a demand for partial replacement of the political elite gain in prominence. On the 
other hand, voters do want to see the emergence of a competent, professional and 
stable political elite, which is capable of good government. The perceived exhaustion 
of the political programmes of the UDF and the BSP and the appearance of the 
movement of the former King has also meant the partial replacement of the political 
elite of the country. A number of young professionals have been appointed to 
positions of high rank in the present government while an entirely new group of 
individuals from various walks of life have entered Parliament. It is too early to assess 
whether these are new, long - standing members of the political elites or individuals 
solely in pursuit of private aims by political means. The BSP has just appointed a 35 – 
year old, reform – minded person to lead the party and the UDF will be electing a new 
leader in early 2002 with the intention to bring forth younger, less well – known 
individuals of the post – 1989 generation. It is quite clear that the ability of parties to 
continually bring forth capable, fresh recruits to the political elite will enhance the 
stability of the political system and will help ensure a proper balance between stability 
of elite, capacities of good government and responsiveness to social expectation. 
  
  
CAVEATS 
  
Caveats are needed. The described series of crisis are of an entity in democratic 
consolidation rather than democratization. These are crises produced by the 
consequences of democratic and market reform rather than by the dynamics of 
democratization. They are a product of implementation rather than suspension of 
reform. Some of the causes are inherent, while others reflect the pace and mode of 
management of reform.  
  
A central implication of the analysis is that the present difficulties could usefully be 
considered within the conceptual framework of theory of development rather than 
theory of democratization. This will take into consideration that democracy is being 
consolidated and that the success of this enterprise will be further ensured by a series 
of measures, which produce growth and development. In other words, the above – 
described crises do not constitute a systemic threat to democracy. They do, however, 
represent a threat to the capacity to continue consolidation and reform at a sufficient 
pace which, coupled with a developmental approach, will ensure long – term stability 
of democracy. In addition, this observation takes into consideration the fact that the 
most difficult decisions of reform have already been taken and that the post – 
transition contours of democracy and economy are firmly in place. Public support for 
EU and NATO membership remains to be solid and successive governments have 
implemented policies of responsible and constructive international and regional 
engagement.  
  
The regional context also needs to be highlighted. Bulgaria has withstood pressures 
emanating from the regional areas of instability and conflict. Spill – over effects such 
as international organized crime have been contained and do not constitute a 
significant source of instability. Nevertheless, continued strife and volatility hinder 
the emergence of a regional context where democracy and development will 
constitute the main grid of interaction. In this sense, persisting conflict and weak 
statehood do have a negative impact on the efforts of Bulgaria to attain integration in 
Euro – Atlantic institutions and sufficient level of development.   
  
Events and developments over the last few years have led to the emergence of a 
specific mindset. Prolonged reform and the concentration of the most radical elements 
of reform within the short timeframe of the last four years have contributed to a 
heightened sense of personal insecurity and volatility. This has produced, on the one 
hand, a deeply skeptical public distrustful of intermediaries and, on the other, a 
disposition of continued expectation of growth and advance through abrupt, major 
shifts in economy and society. If persistent, such dispositions could have an extremely 
negative impact on democracy beyond the odd instance of support for personal 
charisma. The potential impact of these dispositions on electoral support distribution, 
readiness to engage in direct protest, readiness to challenge the reform agenda, etc. 
has already been highlighted and needs to be observed closely.   
  
Due attention should be given to another phenomenon. There is, at present, a firm 
perception that transition ends with integration in the Euro – Atlantic institutions. 
Whether this is an adequate analytical evaluation cannot be examined presently and 
will be of little relevance to public perceptions. What has emerged is the conviction 
that membership seals the processes of transition to democracy and market economy 
and constitutes the final act of legitimation to the transition project. This perception 
has provided an important pool of patience as the reform agenda was being 
implemented. From this point of view, a double disappointment vis-à-vis Bulgaria’s 
bids for EU and NATO membership in 2002 could have a serious destabilizing effect. 
There is sufficient public awareness of the fact that there is no complete overlap 
between the agendas of reform and Euro – Atlantic integration. Thus, a 
disappointment in 2002 might have as a consequence the increased insistence on the 
divergence between the agenda of reform and these of Euro – Atlantic integration.   
  
  
ROADMAP FOR REFORM 
  
The above-made analysis and caveats form the background of a possible roadmap for 
reform. The suggestions for reform may be divided in various segments: 
  
I. Reforms in politics and government   
  
• Re-legitimation of democratic institutions and political parties. This task 
might be accomplished by enhancing the capacity of parties to aggregate 
social and economic interests and ensure sufficient and effective 
representation. One avenue to be explored is that of improved dialogue on 
policy with branch and interest organizations as well as civic 
organizations. A further important task could be the enhancement of 
parties and their leadership to present policy measures in terms, which 
relate and link policies to social groups and citizens. The opening of 
parties to civil society and local communities is yet another area of 
reform. Recruitment to political and administrative office of capable 
members of local communities is of particular importance.  
• A political debate on the effective scope of state and governmental 
intervention. While the extent of state intervention is a vital distinguishing 
characteristic of politics, it is necessary to define the minimum of public 
services, which can be supplied effectively and usefully. Special care will 
then need to be taken to ensure that such services are provided in a 
manner, which strengthens the perception of government as an effective 
tool. 
• An open process of policy formulation and implementation. This entails 
improving the capacity of Parliament and Executive (ministries and other 
state agencies) to conduct dialogue with interested parties in the process 
of policy formulation and implementation. It will ensure better 
representation of interests and provide important feedback on the 
effectiveness of legal norms and the need to modify them.   
• Increased intensity of efforts to ensure integration in Euro – Atlantic 
structures. This will allow the benefit of membership to begin to take its 
course and will, at the same time, provide more space for government in 
policy formulation and structuring of agenda. 
• A system of governance, which is closer to the citizens of the country. 
This will entail a measured reform of local government providing tax 
collection and management powers to this layer of government, thereby 
ensuring a greater degree of decentralization. A further option is the 
introduction of an Ombudsman at the various level of government 
ensuring direct points of entry for citizens.  
• Improvement in functioning of administrative structures. Further efforts to 
improve administrative capacity and effectiveness in the provision of 
public services through introduction of managerial techniques and 
qualitative and quantitative measurements of efficiency. A further option 
is the introduction of greater transparency in all state agencies relating to 
monetary collections and the reduction of administrative hindrances to 
market entry and economic activity.   
• A strategy for further training of local political and administrative elites, 
thereby ensuring successful decentralization. This will involve the 
elaboration of multi – faceted programmes for management training, 
political and administrative skill, public dialogue, representation of 
interest, etc.  
• Continued attention to improvement of the actual exercise of civil and 
political rights and implementation of policies, which facilitate the 
exercise of the rights protected by the Constitution. Effective access to 
justice needs particular attention.  
• Completion of the reform of the judiciary. This will have a positive 
impact on economic activity and ensure access to justice for citizens. 
Particular emphasis will have to be placed on the streamlining of court 
administration, greater efficiency, better knowledge of EU and 
international law, training of judges, etc.  
• Implementation of a comprehensive strategy to tackle corruption, which 
could be linked to the reform of the judicial system. This will entail 
effective enforcement of legal provisions, successful prosecution of 
corruption – related criminal acts, adequate administrative structures, 
decreasing tolerance to corrupt practices, sustained engagement by the 
media, etc.  
• Continued extension of practices of political dialogue and linkages 
between the largest political parties and the Movement of Rights and 
Liberties whose main constituents are of Turkish ethnic origin. Continued 
dialogue with political and non – political organizations of the Roma 
minority. 
• Drafting and implementation of pro-active media strategies by state 
agencies ensuring improved policy understanding. This will entail greater 
attention to explanation and justification of policy decisions through the 
media and professional and interest organizations.  
• Sustained assistance to local cultural centers. This could be done through 
targeted tax exemptions, a system of moderate direct subsidies, 
information campaigns, etc.  
  
  
II. Reforms in economy and society 
  
• Introduction of a moderate policy of demand stimulation while ensuring 
the preservation of the currency board until Bulgaria joins the EU. These 
might entail targeted tax preferences, public works, training of 
unemployed, state guarantees for loans, infrastructure investment, etc.    
• Implementation of a policy of export support for Bulgarian companies and 
a policy of support for certain growth industries in the country. Support 
could be extended to industries, which show growth potential, employ 
large groups of individuals and represent significant contributors to the 
state budget.   
• Implementation of a tax and incomes policy, which allows individuals to 
maintain high levels of disposable income in a context of notable mistrust 
in the capacity of institutions to deliver public goods. This is to be 
accompanied by stability of legal and institutional framework in the 
functioning of the reformed systems of social security, health care and 
pension. 
• Concerted attempts at foreign debt re – scheduling, which would notably 
decrease budgetary pressures and provide funds for demand stimulation. 
These efforts are to be coupled by prudence in the use of bond issuance as 
a means of capital accumulation.  
• Completion of the process of privatization through a series of transparent 
deals bringing to an end this element of reform. The completion of 
privatization will lead to a reduction of the potential sources of corruption. 
This is to be coupled with further reform in public procurement legislation 
and its implementation.   
• Further improvements in investment policy, including tax preference, 
improved and simplified administrative infrastructure, efficient judicial 
system, etc. Such measures might additionally be targeted at growth 
sectors of the economy, which have the potential to generate long – term, 
high – income employment. An additional element would involve a region 
– by – region approach, thus tackling the enormous disproportions of 
employment within the country.  
• Implementation of sustained regional policy, which takes into 
consideration the vast regional disparities in economic opportunity and 
development. In addition to tax preference, this could entail state support 
for information campaigns in foreign countries representing the 
investment opportunities in particular regions.  
• Encouragement of dialogue with trade unions and branch organizations 
and groups of interest ensuring better representation and trust in the 
political system. This will entail consultation in the process of drafting 
and implementation of legislation, impact analysis of legislative and 
policy measures and post – policy adoption dialogue, thereby ensuring a 
more inclusive mode of governance.  
• Encouragement of further investment in the media by well - established 
international media companies, thereby improving the level of political 
and policy debate. This will contribute to further diversity of informed 
opinion and greater presence of non – sensationalist programming and 
publications. Increased attention to the work of the local media represents 
an important new element. Greater dialogue between central and local 
government and the local media also deserves due attention.  
• Continuation and expansion of all programmes of minority integration, 
short of positive discrimination, including additional appointments in 
local administration and law enforcement structures. This could involve 
the extension of “community policing” to all regions of the country. 
• Taining programmes and “Stay in school” programmes for ethnic 
minorities coupled with possible public works projects for targeted 
regions and cities. These programmes could be conducted in consultation 
with local businesses and in accordance with local labour markets.  
 
